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JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

TO ACCOMPANY

S. Con. Res. 2

TOGETHER WITH THE
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HAYDEN



FEBRUARY 23 (legislative day, FEBRUARY 22), 1956.—Ordered to be printed

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28 JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

A Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was established because of the particular nature of the nuclear problem and the fact that the Federal Government was forced to go into private business on a massive scale. This had important domestic implications in a broad range of fields. The intelligence activities, which it is proposed be subject to a joint committee's scrutiny, are peculiarly the prerogative of the Executive and intimately associated with the conduct of the foreign relations of the country.

I am firmly convinced that Congress now, through its regular committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations has the opportunity to get the necessary information from the Central Intelligence Agency and the designated members of those committees are doing so without in any way endangering the security of the information given them. We must also remember that the Central Intelligence Agency carries on its work outside the United States boundaries. Many of its agents are in constant physical danger. We, as Members of Congress, must do our part to see that the work is carried on wisely, efficiently, and with due security to the persons who are working in the interests of our Government.

The contacts between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Congress should never be allowed to prejudice or compromise the highly secret work of that Agency. What the Congress has needed to know in the past it has been told. What the Congress will require to know in the future it can obtain through means already in existence. A new joint committee will only complicate the process.

For the above stated reasons I voted against reporting Senate concurrent resolution 2 to the Senate and urgently recommend that it be not agreed to.

CARL HAYDEN.

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of value only for pre-1949 history.

1958

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We felt that he was well qualified to render outstanding service to the Federal Government such as he had rendered to the State of Florida in a similar regulatory position for about 8 years. We learned nothing whatever of a derogatory nature either about his personal life or about any business or other connections of his that would in any way interfere with the honorable discharge of his responsibilities.

Still later I was advised by Governor Adams that a thorough FBI investigation had been completed and that Mr. Mack had received an excellent report from the FBI. There was every reason, therefore, why the Florida Senators could and should support the appointment of Mr. Mack, a seemingly qualified applicant, a Democrat and a respected Floridian, to this important Federal post. Similar reason existed for the approval of Mr. Mack by the officials of the Republican organization in Florida, his nomination by the President, the approving report on his nomination by the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, and his confirmation by action of the full Senate.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolution, and they were signed by the President pro tempore:

S. 1740. An act to authorize the payment from the employees' life-insurance fund of expenses incurred by the Civil Service Commission in making certain beneficial association assumption agreements and to extend the time for making such agreements;

H. R. 776. An act to permit temporary free importation of automobiles and parts of automobiles when intended solely for show purposes;

H. R. 5005. An act to suspend for 2 years the duty on crude chicory and to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 as it relates to chicory;

H. R. 8794. An act to provide exemptions from the tax imposed on admissions for admission to certain musical and dramatic performances and certain athletic events;

H. R. 9821. An act to amend and supplement the Federal-Aid Road Act approved July 11, 1916 (39 Stat. 355), as amended and supplemented, and the act approved June 29, 1956 (70 Stat. 374), to authorize appropriations for continuing the construction of highways, and for other purposes; and

H. J. Res. 347. A joint resolution authorizing the President to invite the several States and foreign countries to take part in the Fourth International Automation Congress and Exposition to be held in the New York Coliseum at New York, N. Y., from June 9 to June 13, 1958.

EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, from time to time I have spoken harshly of certain newspapers. In my judgment, they have deserved the criticism because they have failed upon occasion to

the trust that they enjoy in our country. The trust and responsibility is theirs of reporting fairly, accurately, and objectively. Such objective reporting is indispensable to the citizen if decisions on public matters are to be informed decisions.

Because I have been critical in some instances, it is incumbent upon me to give deserved praise when such is due. It is an even greater joy to me to be able to commend honestly a newspaper with whose editorial judgments I am in general disagreement.

This morning, Mr. President, a newspaper representing the viewpoint of the financial community, the Wall Street Journal, published two items which deserve widespread and thoughtful consideration.

The first story concerns the Office of the President of the United States, and is a factual description of the organizational changes which have taken place under the present holder. The second piece is an editorial entitled "Power and Privilege." This is a discussion of the constitutional aspects of what has come to be termed "executive privilege."

These two items are interrelated and both address themselves to a problem which is causing an increasing sense of concern to many people. This is the problem of executive responsibility or more precisely, presidential responsibility.

When it is openly stated by the Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. Raab, that the President has concentrated upon 5 percent of his tasks giving what time he has to spare to the other 95 percent, there is indeed a grave cause for concern. Let us hope, in the name of charity, that Mr. Raab overspoke. But even if only 50 percent of the delegated or discarded duties—and here, Mr. President, I use the words that were used by Mr. Raab in the interview—were to be vested in appointed personnel, the thesis of the editorial in the Wall Street Journal still remains striking.

Mr. President, I should like to quote from the editorial:

Executive privilege is a matter that the Congress and the executive branch have locked horns on a number of times, and unless we are greatly mistaken, Congress has never conceded that, as a matter of broad policy, the executive branch has a blanket right to refuse information to the lawmakers. Presidents have done so—mostly for political reasons to keep the opposition from making too much sunny hay—and when Presidents have refused, the majority in Congress did not think the issue important enough to settle the question whether there is actually any legal right to executive privilege, or like Topsy, it just grew.

My comment here, Mr. President, is that the strictures of the editorial do fairly reflect the situation.

There have been many individual Senators, on both sides of the aisle, who from time to time, have raised their voices in warning, but whose advice was not taken, and thus, Mr. President, in one sense the Congress is open to the charge that we have permitted the practice of executive privilege to grow completely out of bounds. I might add that

it to the people and to our own institutions to make sure that we do not continue to do so in the future.

I desire to make very clear, that I have always recognized—and I recognize today—the power of the President of the United States under the separation of powers doctrine to refrain from giving to the Congress of the United States information the publication of which he believes would in any way impede him in performing his executive functions and powers granted to him by the Constitution of the United States.

As a matter of constitutional law there is no doubt that such inherent power vests in the Office of the President of the United States under the separation of powers doctrine.

What has been overlooked in so much of the debate on this matter is that it is not a constitutional mandate—it is what we lawyers call a permissive power. There is nothing which prevents the President of the United States from making available to the Congress so-called executive information, if Congress in good faith seeks that information and believes it is necessary as an aid to Congress in carrying out the legislative process.

The exercise of such permissive authority on the part of a President in no way weakens the executive branch of Government under the Constitution. To the contrary, in my judgment, if Presidents had more frequently exercised this permissive right, it would have, in fact, strengthened them with the Congress and with the country.

What we see developing now is rather frightening. We have the Secretary to the Cabinet saying, in effect, that the President of the United States concentrates his time and effort on about 5 percent of his executive duties, which means, of course, if the figures used by the White House spokesman are correct, the President delegates to others the rest of his duties. So what we really have going on in the Government is a procedure whereby much of the executive administration is being handled not by persons elected to office by the people of the United States, but by appointees in the various echelons of executive organization. When the Congress seeks a review, in effect, of what those persons have been doing, and asks for information which pertains to their activities, what are we met with? We are met with the plea of executive privilege.

I shall not say, Mr. President, that under the separation-of-powers doctrine the present President or any other President does not have a constitutional right to raise such a plea. I doubt if I would go so far as the Wall Street Journal goes in its editorial this morning on this point. But what I wish to suggest is that one can abuse a permissive grant. The fact that under the Constitution a discretion is granted to the President of the United States does not mean that in the exercise of such discretion he may not become guilty of its abuse.

I think that is what is happening, because whenever there is a denial of information to the Congress of the United States under the plea of executive priv-

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The trend to bigger staff and more delegation of duty began long before Mr. Eisenhower's heart attack in September 1955. He set out deliberately, to replace President Truman's highly personalized operation of the Presidency with a complex staff system headed by former New Hampshire Governor Adams.

THE TREND QUICKENS

His heart attack, however, quickened the trend. The total White House work force had climbed from 250 to 294 just before Mr. Eisenhower was stricken. By mid-1956, it had jumped to 375. Moreover, the President's intimates began casting about for ways to reduce their ailing Chief's workload—a task they're still concerned with now.

Among his personal staff, the big growth has come in a breed known as special assistants or consultants. In 1953, only 1 of the President's 24 close associates really came under this category; he was C. D. Jackson, psychological warfare adviser. Two others, economic aid Gabriel Hauge and national security expert Cutler, now listed as Special Assistants, were then administrative aids. Now the special consultants number more than 15, including Meyer Kestnbaum, who keeps track of Hoover Commission recommendations on reorganizing the Government; Lt. Gen. Elwood Quesada, Adviser to the President on Airports and Air Traffic Controls, and Arthur Larson, nominally an adviser on cold-war propaganda, but actually a speechwriter and idea man.

The special consultants, by and large, coordinate Government matters that involve more than one Federal agency. Retired Maj. Gen. John S. Bragdon, for example, keeps an eye on public works planning by some 42 branches of Government. Clarence Francis, retired chairman of General Foods Corp., tries to compromise the oft-conflicting views of the State and Agriculture Departments on United States surplus farm disposal programs.

A BRANCH IS BORN

As the special consultants took on assistants of their own as well as clerical help, a new White House branch was born—known as special projects—with a budget all its own. Almost 100 people went to work for this branch when it was started in 1956, drawing \$866,000 in salaries and expenses that fiscal year. By June of 1959, special projects is due to account for 145 workers—one-third of the total White House payroll—at a cost of \$1,450,000 for the year. Experts in science and personnel management will make up most of the increase from the current level of about 120 employees.

Special consultants and other White House staff members take up much of Mr. Eisenhower's time each day. Chief of Staff Adams, press aids and confidant Hagerty and Maj. Gen. Wilton (Jerry) Persons, the President's Ambassador to Capitol Hill, drop in to see him several times daily; the door is open to him at all times. Other staff men who specialize in one field or another may see him just a few times a week—sometimes even less frequently—depending on the current issues.

Theoretically, any staff member can see Mr. Eisenhower at any time. But since his illnesses, most aids, in practice, have been more cautious about barging in on the President. "You just don't go in to see him on every little thing," one Eisenhower lieutenant explains. Since the President's stroke, another aid says, "the tendency has been to check more often with Adams before you go in to see the Chief."

Nevertheless, staff members may drop by to check something with the President 10 or 20 times, all told, on a given day. By contrast, Mr. Eisenhower usually has 3 or 4 official visits by others on his appointment book on an average day, besides a regular meeting with, say his Cabinet, the National Security Council or GOP legislative leaders.

Intermediary between him and the rest of his administration—an increasingly important role these days as the President lets Cabinet members run their own departments with less and less direct guidance. Sometimes, Mr. Eisenhower personally settles a dispute within his administration, such as the Dulles-Stassen dispute that ended with Harold Stassen's resignation, as disarmament consultant to the President. But more often, Sherman Adams and company thrash out the issues with the officials involved.

Mr. Eisenhower's lieutenants insist they don't make the decisions. What they do, as they see it, is study an issue, pull together the facts, toss out the insignificant alternatives and boil down policy recommendations to a few real choices, or perhaps a single recommendation for their Chief to approve.

Many major issues that cross department lines are brought before the Cabinet, if they touch on domestic matters—how to cope with the recession, for example—or to the National Security Council, if they involve strategy planning. The pattern here is much the same as the one evolved for staff level decisions—intensive preparation to boil down the alternative solutions to a minimum. More than his two immediate predecessors, Mr. Eisenhower relies on his Cabinet for actual policymaking. Usually, he abides by majority sentiment.

The President has turned the Cabinet into a highly formalized organization. He has appointed the first secretary the Cabinet has ever had, ubiquitous Max Rabb, to help him manage the Cabinet's affairs. And Mr. Rabb has an assistant, career civil servant, Bradley Patterson, Jr. For the first time, a written agenda for each Friday morning Cabinet session is prepared and circulated to Cabinet officials in advance.

BRIEFING THE BOSS

The extent of the staff work in the Cabinet, however, goes far beyond the two full-time Cabinet officials. Between meetings, Mr. Rabb and other White House staff members, depending on the issue, consult with the sub-Cabinet, a group composed of departmental under secretaries, to screen issues that will be brought before the Cabinet. Mr. Rabb works with Cabinet members beforehand to help sharpen their presentation at the meeting. He even briefs Mr. Eisenhower just before the Cabinet session itself.

To carry out Cabinet decisions, a new group of highly placed officials in each Federal department—known as the special assistants for Cabinet coordination—has been created. These men meet with Mr. Rabb right after a Cabinet session; records of decisions calling for action are compiled and distributed and Mr. Rabb rides herd on these special assistants to see that new policies are implemented, and to drum up suggestions for future Cabinet topics.

Mr. Rabb is proud of the Cabinet organization. "Hardly a week passes," says the former Massachusetts lawyer, "without briefings on the new White House staff techniques being given to students of political science or to key Government administrators coming to us from foreign countries."

Mr. Eisenhower is turning over more of his duties as leader of the Republican Party to his assistants, too. The White House answer to charges from GOP politicians that the President is inaccessible has chiefly been to make, not Eisenhower, but Mr. Adams more available to them. Mr. Adams now greets the White House and, moreover, meets with small groups of GOP legislators from time to time over afternoon cocktails elsewhere in Washington.

The President's associates still are searching for ways to cut his workload further.

Although they're not peddling talk of such activities because of the widespread attacks on Mr. Eisenhower as a "do-little" leader.

Aids would like, for instance, for Congress to authorize the Attorney General to sign private relief bills applying only to individuals and relieve the President of approving over 300 such measures each year. White House officials complain, too, Mr. Eisenhower wastes time on such chores required by law as personally reading and O. K'ing specifications for fish hatcheries or the schedule of concerts by the Marine Band.

"Even if one should take away 95 percent of the tasks the President performs and discard them or delegate them to others," contends Mr. Rabb, "the remaining 5 percent of the tasks of the President would still make it the most difficult job in the world." He adds, "It's that 5 percent of hard, tough decision making on which the President himself has concentrated in the past 5 years—giving what time he has to spare to the other 95 percent."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

NUCLEAR TESTS

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, it is unfortunate that in the matter of testing nuclear weapons we have allowed the Soviet Union to secure a psychological advantage. We all know that the people of this Nation and of the Western world stand for freedom and peace and the individual worth of the person. It is particularly unfortunate that during this time, when the people of the United States and of the Western World will be attending Easter services in their churches and temples and synagogues, that we have allowed ourselves to be placed in a rather unfortunate situation in connection with the H-bomb.

Of course, it may be that this is a trick on the part of the Soviet Union, and that the attitude of Mr. Dulles and of the President may be to some extent justified.

It may also be that the Soviet announcement, after the Soviet Union had completed its nuclear tests, was prompted by the fact that they now have nothing to lose.

In any event, it would certainly seem that even if the administration is adamant in wishing to go ahead with its tests this summer, it should reconsider its position after those tests are over.

Unless we take the leadership on plans for disarmament before the United Nations and other public forums of the world, and unless we take the leadership in trying to stop explosions of atomic bombs, it may not be possible to stop the atomic race later on. We know that Britain already has the hydrogen bomb, and that France is desperately trying to develop one. Other nations also may eventually have the hydrogen bomb, and then the situation may be out of control.

I was impressed by what the noted columnist, Walter Lippmann, had to say about the matter in his column published in the Washington Post this morning. He said that the issue had not been dealt with forthrightly.

I was also impressed by what Drew Pearson said in his column in the Washington Post this morning. It contains valuable public information, and I there-

Material in this file which should be included in history:

1. Problem of CIA use of intelligence is acquired on the atomic energy programs of other countries.
2. Problem of exchange of information in restricted data category between Agency employees with "Q" clearances and DOD personnel receiving restricted data under § 143 of the AEC Act of 1954.
3. Problem of avoiding full field investigation for Agency employees needing a clearance - granting of clearance on basis of Agency files.

§ 145 & 143

Contents of Legislation File

1. Paper by Harold P. Green, INFORMATION CONTROL AND ATOMIC POWER DEVELOPMENT, published 1956.
2. Pamphlet WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT AEC SECURITY, Revision, June 1957
3. House Report 2639, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to accompany H.R. 9757
4. Joint Committee Print, December 1956, Atomic Energy Legislation Through 84th Congress.
5. Letter dated 8 Jan 1959 from DCI to Stans, Director of BOB, Subject: Views on the Atomic Energy Commission's draft Omnibus Bill for 1959
6. Letter from AEC, dated 28 November 1958, to Stans, BOB
7. Pamphlet by Becker and Huard, Vol. 44, No. 1, November 1955. TORT LIABILITY AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY
8. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security, March 24 1955, AEC-FCDA Relationship
9. House Report 2660, Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1954, 16 Aug. 1954
10. P.L. 82-235, An Act, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
11. House Report 1104, Atomic Energy Act amendments, 8 Oct 1951
12. Senate Report 894, Atomic Energy Act, 8 Oct 1951
13. Hearing before JCAE, Patent Aspects of the Atomic Energy Act 31 March 1950
14. P.L. 79-585, For the development and control of atomic energy
15. Joint Committee Print, Report on the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, January 1957, 85th Congress, 1st Session

16. Senate Report 413, Principal Office Building for Atomic Energy Commission, 6 June 1957
17. P.L. 85-287, To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to increase the salaries of certain executives of the AEC, and etc.
18. Letter to DCI, dated 16 Jan 1959 from Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Atomic Energy), Subject: Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group
19. Letter to Assistant Secretary of Defense, from DCI, dated 24 Dec. 1958, Subject same as above.
20. Letter to McCone, AEC, from DCI, dated 4 Aug 1958, Subject: Amendment to section 143 of Atomic Energy Act of 1954
21. Memo for the Record, dated 10 Feb 1958, Subject: Atomic Energy Legislation , signed by LRH
22. Letter from Mr. Houston, dated 29 January 1958, to Ramey, JCAE
23. Letter to Mr. Houston, dated 28 January 1958, from Ramey, JCAE
24. Letter to Strauss, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, from Pastore, Chairman, Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation, dated 28 January 1958.
25. Letter dated 3 March 1957, from DCI, to Strauss, AEC
26. Letter to DCI, dated 15 Feb 1957 from Chairman, AEC
27. Letter to Jones, BOB, dated 16 Nov 1956, from Norman Paul, Legislative Counsel
28. Letter to Cook, AEC, dated 1 Sept. 1956, from Cabell, Acting DCI
29. Letter to DCI from Cook, AEC, dated 24 Aug 1956
30. Letter to Jones, BOB, from Paul, Legislative Counsel, 30 July 1956
31. Senate Report 2530, Amending Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 11 July 1956 To accompany S. 4203
32. S. 4203, Calendar No. 2569, In the Senate, 11 July 1956, To amend Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

33. Memo from Director Legislative Program, Secretary of Defense, to Speaker Rayburn, Subject: Legislative and Public Affairs
34. Memo for DCI from Legislative Counsel, 13 July 1956, Subject: Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act
35. Letter to Anderson, JCAE, dated 11 July 1956, from DCI
36. Memo for Mr. Houston from [] Subject: International Atomic Energy Statute, dated 27 June 1956 25X1
37. Memo for Mr. Houston, from Legislative Counsel, 7 June 1956 Subject: Atomic Energy Amendments
38. Letter from Cabell, dated 25 May 1956 to Strauss, AEC
39. Letter to Brundage, BOB, dated 25 May 1956 from Cabell
40. Letter to Strauss, AEC, dated 8 Sept. 1955 from Cabell
41. Letter to Jones, BOB, dated 24 May 1956, from Paul, Legislative Counsel
- 25X1 42. Memo for the Record by [] OGC, 2 May 1956, Subject: A, E. Act of 54
43. Memorandum for General Counsel from Asst. Director/Scientific Intelligence, dated 13 April 1956, Subject: Justification for Revision to Provisions of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which Limits Exchange of Restricted Data with DOD Personnel
- 25X1 44. Memo for Record from [] OGC, dated 22 March 1956, Subject: AEC - Clearance Duplication
45. Memo for Deputy Director (Intelligence) dated 2 April 1956, from Mr. Houston, Subject: Atomic Energy Commission Clearances
- 25X1 46. Memo for Deputy Director (Support, dated 31 January 1956, from [] OGC, Subject: Security Problems with AEC
47. Memorandum for the Record, dated 25 January 1956, by [] OGC, Subject: AEC - Accessibility of Restricted Data Between DOD Personnel and Those with Que Clearances from other Agencies. 25X1
48. Memo for Record, 18 Jan 1956, by [] Subject: Meeting with Ferguson, Deputy General Counsel, AEC 25X1

- 25X1
49. Memo for General Counsel, 12 Jan 1956, from Asst. Dir. Scientific Intelligence, Subject: Transmission of Restricted Data to DOD Non-Que Cleared Personnel
 50. Memo for Director, 12 January 1956, from Mr. Houston, Subject: CIA Briefings of JCAE
 51. Suggested Draft for AEC Letter to Atty. General Re. clearances.
 52. Memo to attn: [redacted] [redacted] 25X1
Office of General Counsel, Subject: Operational/Legal, Legal Problems Relating to Peacetime Uses of Atomic Energy, 8 November 1956, JSW
 53. Memo for Director, dated 7 Feb 1955, by Mr. Houston, Subject: [redacted] 25X1
 54. Memo for Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, from DCI Subject: Removal from the Restricted Data Category of Information Concerning the Atomic Energy Program of Other Nations:
 55. Draft No. 1 of two drafts of language suggested by the Atomic Energy Commission and forwarded by us to the Committee. 1 July 1954
 56. Letter to Cole, JCAE, dated 25 June 1954, from DCI
 57. Draft # 1 and Draft #2 of Section 142 e in the legislation submitted to JCAE
 58. Memo for Director, dated 12 June 1954 from Mr. Houston, Subject: Atomic Energy "Restricted Data" and Its Relationship to Intelligence Info
 59. Draft dated 4 June 1954 of Memo for DCI from Mr. Houston, Subject: Definition of Atomic Energy "Restricted Data" and its Relationship to Intelligence Information
 60. Memo for Deputy Director (Administration), from Pforzheimer, dated(?) Subject: Fifteenth Semiannual Report of the Atomic Energy Commission
 61. Letter to Director of BOB, dated 21 December 1953, from Pforzheimer 25X1
 62. Memo for Mr. Amory, 17 December 1953, Subject: Draft of Atomic Energy Legislative Amendments
 63. CIA Comment Concerning Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 17 December 1953

64. Letter to DCI from Jones, BOB, dated 2 Dec. 1953
65. Memo for Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 2 Aug 1951, from DCI. Subject: [REDACTED] 25X1
66. [REDACTED] 25X1
67. Memo for Record, 18 June 1951, by Pforzheimer, Subject: Exchange of information in the field of atomic energy
68. Memo for File, from Chadwell, Asst Director Scientific Intelligence, 26 April 1951, Subject: Conversations between Messrs. Lay and Gleason, NSC, and Messrs. Houston and Pforzheimer, [REDACTED] and Dr. Chadwell, on 25 April 1951 at 1500 hours. 25X1
69. Letter to Chairman, AEC, from Comptroller General, 30 December 49, Controller of AEC salary rate
70. Letter from Chairman, AEC, to Warren, Comptroller General, dated 15 December 1949
71. Memo to Director, from Pforzheimer, 9 June 1948, Subject: Budget request of the AEC. House Appropriations Committee report.
72. Letter dated 7 May 1948, from Executive Director to Staats, BOB, Comments on S. 1004, to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
73. "Title II - Atomic Energy, Chapter I - Atomic Energy Commission, Part 70 - Definition of Fissionable Material, from Chairman, AEC.
74. Memo for Director from Pforzheimer, dated 11 Feb 1948, Subject: Functions of the Atomic Energy Commission
75. Memo for Executive Director, dated 2 Feb 1948, from Executive for Inspection and Security, Subject: FBI Clearance of Personnel
76. Memo for Executive Director, 30 September 1946, from Chief, Legislative Liaison Branch, Subject: Clandestine Activities in the Field of Atomic Energy
77. Memo for DCI dated 24 September 1946, from Legislative Liaison Subject: Summary of Memo dated 23 Sept 1946, Intelligence Implications of the [REDACTED]
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78. Memo for DCI, from Chief, Legislative Liaison Branch, Subject Atomic Energy Act of 1946, dated 23 Sept. 1946
79. Memo for DCI from Legislative Liaison, dated 23 Sept, 1946, Subject: Intelligence Implications in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
80. Memo to Mr. Houston, from West, Office of the Chief of Staff, Subject: Atomic Energy Legislation, 14 May 1946
81. Memo for Director, dated 29 April 1946, from General Counsel, Subject Legislative Hearings for Atomic Energy Commission
82. Letter to West, Office of the Chief of Staff, from Mr. Houston, 26 April 1946, Subject: S. 1717 and Atomic Energy Bill.
83. Memo for File from Mr. Houston, 22 April 1946, Subject: GAC and Unvouchered Funds
84. LEGAL PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM INDUSTRIAL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY.